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Power-Sharing as a Means of Conflict Resolution

A Comparative Analysis of the Peace Processes in Northern Ireland and Cyprus

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Table of Contents

A) Introduction ... 4
B) Definition of the Main Concepts ... 4
1. Power-sharing ... 4
2. Consociationalism ... 6
C) Historical Background of Northern Ireland and Cyprus ... 8
1. Northern Ireland ... 8
2. Cyprus ... 10
3. Similarities and Differences ... 12
D) Peace Agreements: Northern Ireland vs Cyprus ... 13
1. Adoptability of Power-Sharing Agreements ... 13
2. The Sunningdale Agreement ... 14
3. The Good Friday Agreement ... 15
4. The Road to the Annan Plan ... 17
5. The Annan Plan ... 18
E) External Actors in Northern Ireland and Cyprus ... 20
1. The Role of External Actors in Northern Ireland ... 20
2. The Role of External Actors in Cyprus ... 22
F) Future Obstacles for Northern Ireland and Cyprus ... 24
1. Is Brexit Affecting Adaptability in Northern Ireland? ... 24
2. Is There a Prospect of Adoptability in Cyprus? ... 26
G) Conclusion ... 29
References ... 31

Abstract

Historical ethnic cleavages transpiring into periods of intense violence and political disarray are features that characterise both Northern Ireland and Cyprus in their recent history. Many similarities about the conflicts in both countries can be observed, yet Northern Ireland has been successful at securing peace and Cyprus has not. This paper aims to explain why this has been the case and if it could be possible for Cyprus to reach an agreement in the future. The approaches used in both countries concerning power-sharing are addressed and a considerable focus is applied to the theory of power-sharing known as consociationalism. The main conclusion taken from the study is that the peace process in Cyprus has been a long and arduous development, that whilst many will consider as a failure, has been successful in agreeing on a framework for the institutional makeup of the country through a bi-zonal and bi-communal federation. The next step for Cyprus is to overcome the external contextual factors holding back a peace agreement and this paper argues that the approach taken in Northern Ireland could be used to influence future negotiations.

Keywords

Power-sharing, Consociationalism, Adoptability, Adaptability, Northern Ireland, Cyprus.

A) Introduction

The importance of studying power-sharing arrangements cannot be understated, as these agreements have been crucial elements in stopping violence at its source and providing a framework of good governance for divided countries to move forward upon. This paper aims to answer the question: how can Cyprus implement a power-sharing arrangement, using Northern Ireland as an example, in order to solve the dispute between Greek and Turkish Cypriots? Furthermore, the paper aims to explain why the issues of adoptability and adaptability have been navigated successfully in Northern Ireland, but in Cyprus they have not. By conducting an empirical analysis of the peace processes in both countries and scrutinising the relevant agreements, we can develop a better understanding of why Cyprus has not successfully adopted a power-sharing administration and how it may look to do this successfully in the future.

Chapter B will serve as a theoretical analysis of the relevant terms such as power-sharing, consociationalism and consociational democracy and provide a detailed explanation of power-sharing and what subsequent terms fall under this explanation. Chapter C serves as a case study and historical analysis of Northern Ireland and Cyprus. The historical context of ethnic rivalry in both countries is of paramount importance as it explains why conflict has occurred and why power- sharing institutions are necessary in the contemporary context. In Chapter D the peace processes of both countries will be analysed and the important agreements will be assessed. Chapter E will analyse the role of external actors in both countries. Chapter F concludes the analysis by looking at the future for both Cyprus and Northern Ireland.

The importance of research in this area is evident as the comparative analysis of peace processes allows us to better understand the patterns and variables involved in each individual situation and allow us to identify similarities that can explain why some are successful and why some fail. In the case of Northern Ireland and Cyprus, there are a lot of identifiable similarities, most notably the historical enmity between two ethnic groups in each country, the lasting paramilitary campaigns against the respective establishments and the partition of both islands and how this has contributed to the disputes in both cases.

B) Definition of the Main Concepts

1. Power-sharing

Power-sharing is a complex political arrangement that is typically born out of disputes concerning self-determination, where two or more individual groups seeking their own individual territorial, economic and/or cultural autonomy through a united push for secession, engage in a political framework that enforces both the equal and equitable sharing of competences throughout a new or already existing state.[1] Historically, these disputes have been violent and with the examples of Northern Ireland and Cyprus this has been the case, where paramilitary campaigns of violence have cost the lives of thousands and military and international intervention has been necessary to stop the conflict and move towards peace agreements.

[1] Sisk, T.D., 1996. *Power sharing and international mediation in ethnic conflicts*. US Institute of Peace Press.

After the end of the Cold War and the subsequent dissolution of Yugoslavia, power-sharing became a popular concept adopted by many states such as Bosnia and Herzegovina and North Macedonia. The reason being that "the dissolution of existing multi-ethnic states, into new ethnically homogeneous countries, is fraught with problems"[2] and that, in the case of Northern Ireland and Cyprus, it is difficult to appease two ethnically divergent and ideologically disparate groups in one singular state. Arend Lijphart states that federalism offers an "excellent opportunity for group autonomy if the groups are geographically concentrated"[3], however if groups are geographically heterogeneous, a different model has to be applied. One answer to this is a power-sharing arrangement, firstly as a method of resolving and preventing further conflict, but secondly as a method to begin a fair and just political process based on peaceful coexistence.

Power-sharing acts as an umbrella term, under which various other types of power-sharing exist such as consociationalism, federalism, integration and territorial autonomy. Keil and McCulloch (2021) note early "power-sharing" from the 1960-1990s which was characterised by the "informal processes of elite interaction engaged in a self-negating prophecy" whilst more recent power-sharing involving "external actors as mediators and more formalised arrangements".[4]

Whilst the majority of self-determination disputes consider territorial autonomy as the key aspect in contention, it is apparent that this is not the only solution to the conflicts. Wolff (2013) expands this idea further as complex power-sharing:

"Complex power-sharing, thus, is the result of the implementation of a self-governance regime whose success as an approach to conflict settlement requires a relatively complex institutional structure that cannot be reduced to autonomy/(ethno-)federalism, (traditional) models of power-sharing or power-dividing".[5]

Wolff explains that "other than claims to territorial self-governance, complex power-sharing arrangements are contingent upon two further characteristics, namely, the significance of the territory in comparison to the rest of the state and to what degree that territory is heterogeneous in its ethnic and cultural makeup".[6] This hypothesis is of course relevant to the case of Northern Ireland, where historical enmity has existed between Irish Nationalists that are typically catholic and British Unionists that are typically protestant. In terms of territorial self-governance, Northern Ireland adopted a devolved assembly and enforces power-sharing based on the framework agreed in the Good Friday Agreement.

In conclusion, power-sharing is a multifaceted term that contains various forms such as federalism, integration and most importantly, consociationalism. Further to this, Wolff's term "complex power-sharing" expands on the debate and highlights the other external, contextual factors that need to be understood and accommodated for if a power-sharing arrangement is to be agreed upon.

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[2] *Ibid.*

[3] Lijphart, A., 2002. "The wave of power-sharing democracy" In Andrew Reynolds, ed., *The architecture of democracy: Constitutional design, conflict management, and democracy*, pp.37-54. Oxford University Press

[4] Keil, S. and McCulloch, A., 2021. *From Plural Democracy to Conflict Resolution…and Back Again: Revisiting the Consociationalism-Federalism Debate*. Annual Conference of the Association for the Study of Nationalities.

[5] Wolff, S., 2009. Complex power-sharing and the centrality of territorial self-governance in contemporary conflict settlements. *Ethnopolitics*, *8*(1), pp.29.

[6] *Ibid*, p.30

2. Consociationalism

Consociational democracy is a term that was first adopted by Arend Lijphart who contends that countries that resemble the concept are "fragmented but stable democracies".[7] Lijphart observes four fundamental characteristics of consociational democracies which firstly includes the existence of a "grand coalition" whereby elites from each group come together to govern with their citizens interests at heart as non-cooperation is seemingly less desirable.[8] The main argument here is that the elites in power "must be able to appease and cooperate with the leaders of political subcultures who will likely engage in divergent, detrimental behaviour that is not conclusive to the maintenance and development of the political framework in place".[9] This idea of a grand coalition is evident in the executive office of the Northern Ireland government as each executive office is made up of different political representatives, elected through the D'hondt system, ensuring proportional representation is observed and a first and deputy first minister that must be derived from a nationalist and unionist party respectively, elected based on the number of votes received.[10]

The next important aspect of a consociational democracy is the existence of a minority veto acting as a balance of power, whereby majority rule cannot succeed at subordinating any minority concerns. The mutual veto is designed to allow minorities to voice their concerns when a majority votes in favour of legislation that endangers the interests of a minority and could subsequently lead to the breakdown of intersegmental elite cooperation.[11] Northern Ireland makes use of the mutual veto through the use of the petition of concern, requiring a minimum of 30/90 Members of Legislative Assembly (MLA's) to be in favour to initiate the veto, stopping legislation until a cross community majority is achieved.[12] The problem observed in Northern Ireland is the abuse of the petition of concern and how it essentially incentivises extremism and that it is too frequently available to the participants in the assembly.[13] Lijphart argues that the frequent use of the veto by a minority is unlikely as it can be turned against its interests[14], however, this has not been the case in Northern Ireland as the petition of concern has been weaponised to benefit the interests of each party, not because it threatens their ethnic or cultural beliefs, but because it may conflict with personal moral and social issues that do not pertain to the specific ethnic reasons for the implementation of the veto itself. The two main unionist and nationalist parties then have the opportunity to halt any legislation they so wish, regardless of the reasoning, so long as they can exceed the 30-person quota to initiate the veto. This can be evidenced through the DUP's use of the petition of concern to block legislation on gay marriage and Sinn Fein blocking legislation on welfare reform.

The next important aspect of consociational democracy is proportional representation. The idea behind proportional representation is the fair allocation of competences as well as executive and

[7] Lijphart, A., 1969. Consociational democracy. *World politics*, *21*(2), pp.207-225.

[8] Lijphart, A., 1977. *Democracy in plural societies: A comparative exploration*. Yale University Press.

[9] Lijphart, A., 1969. Consociational democracy. *World politics*, *21*(2), pp.216

[10] Northern Ireland Assembly, *Allocation of seats in the Assembly Executive and Chairs and Deputy Chairs of Committees, D'hondt method*, UK, Available from: https://archive.niassembly.gov.uk/io/summary/d%27hondt.htm

[11] Lijphart, A., 1977. *Democracy in plural societies: A comparative exploration*. Yale University Press

[12] Northern Ireland Assembly, *Plenary Terms*, UK, Available from: http://aims.niassembly.gov.uk/plenary/terms.aspx

[13] McCulloch, A., 2018. The use and abuse of veto rights in power-sharing systems: Northern Ireland's petition of concern in comparative perspective. *Government and Opposition*, *53*(4), pp.735-756.

[14] Lijphart, A., 1977. *Democracy in plural societies: A comparative exploration*. Yale University Press.

legislative appointments of each identifiable group in a democracy based on their respective allocation of votes in an election. Furthermore, because one of the motivations behind the formation of a minimum winning coalition is that the spoils of government can be divided among as small a number of participants as possible, the proportional representation allocation rule makes a minimum winning coalition less profitable and therefore less probable.[15] Essentially, proportional representation, along with the mutual veto, are both closely tied to the idea of a grand coalition and so work effectively in parallel to contribute to the maintenance of a consociational democracy.

The fourth and final aspect of consociational democracy pertains to autonomy. The concept of autonomy relates to allowing each distinct group the ability to express themselves culturally and retain their sense of individualism within their given state. Lijphart indicates two types of autonomy: territorial and non-territorial autonomy. Territorial autonomy relates to the decentralisation of power, which is commonly related to federal structures, whereby power is diverted from a central government, and dispersed between constituent territorial units. Lijphart notes that for states with geographically concentrated communal groups, a federal system is undoubtedly an excellent way to provide autonomy for these groups.[16] Comparatively, non-territorial autonomy relates to other issues, such as religious cleavages, where the issue can be resolved by to provide educational autonomy by giving equal state financial support to all schools, public and private, as long as basic educational standards are met.[17]

Historically, consociationalism has been a successful instrument of conflict resolution in countries such as Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq and most importantly for this thesis, Northern Ireland. The essence of consociationalism lies in the protection of citizens' fundamental rights and concerns within a divided society and the merging of former adversaries with the primary goal of peaceful coexistence through a power-sharing agreement. The successful implementation of this process can be most commonly observed when the state structure attempts to abide by Lijphart's four aspects of consociationalism mentioned above.

Whilst consociationalism focuses on the recognition of the individual ethnic identities within a divided state, many academics such as Donald Horowitz have criticised consociationalism for this very reason, stating that it actually incentivises interethnic competition.[18] In response to consociationalism, Horowitz proposed the theory of centripetalism, which instead of creating a "grand coalition", aims to create incentives, principally electoral incentives, for moderates to compromise on conflicting group claims, to form interethnic coalitions, and to establish a regime of interethnic majority rule.[19] Centripetalists are less concerned with decentralising power and addressing individual trepidations but are more interested in sedating ethnic cleavages and encouraging parties to work together with incentives based on peace and good governance.

[15] *Ibid.*
[16] *Ibid.*
[17] *Ibid.*
[18] Horowitz, D.L., 2000. *Ethnic groups in conflict*. University of California Press. p.575.
[19] *Ibid.*

C) Historical Background of Northern Ireland and Cyprus

1. Northern Ireland

The conflict in Northern Ireland, commonly referred to as "the troubles" was a vicious, costly, 29 year-long ethnic conflict between British unionists that insisted Northern Ireland must remain part of the United Kingdom and Irish nationalists that maintained that it must immediately or eventually become part of a sovereign Irish nation-state.[20] The conflict spawned various ethnic political parties and paramilitary outfits that represented the political ambitions of both sides through legislative and violent means respectively.[21] It is estimated that the troubles cost the lives of approximately 3500 people, the majority of which being civilians[22], using various heinous methods such as political murders, assassinations, car-bombings, petrol-bombings and human-bombings.[23] According to NISRA (2021) 45.7% of the population is catholic and 43.5% is protestant.[24] This is a salient point, as previous to 2021, Northern Ireland always had a protestant majority, which many argue lent itself to the protestant unionist argument that Northern Ireland should remain British. This clear division has been a central theme to the conflict in the country and still today remains as the sticking point for good governance in Northern Ireland. Unlike Cyprus, the two communities live amongst each other, however many towns and cities sway between being predominantly protestant and unionist or predominantly catholic and nationalist.

The origins of the conflict in Northern Ireland are continually debated however according to O'Leary and McGarry (2016), the indisputable historic cause of the current conflict was the Plantation of Ireland, which saw the forced colonialism of Ulster by the Scots and English in the seventeenth century, primarily under the rule of James I.[25] The prime objective of King James I was to settle protestant, English speaking civilians throughout Ulster in order to subdue any Irish resistance to English rule and ensure a large majority of those residing in Ulster would remain loyal to the king. Much of the ethnic makeup of Northern Ireland was established with the Plantation of Ulster through the consolidation of protestants in the northern part of the island, their integration into the labour market and social society and the subsequent hostility that was spawned against the catholic population that remained.

Following the Plantation, years of Catholic subordination occurred, leading to further resentment and mistrust of British control. Some Irish Catholics favoured Irish self-government within the UK and created the Home Rule movement, whilst some Catholics vowed for full self-determination and detachment from the UK creating the Irish Republican movement. Ultimately the Republican movement resorted to violent means and led an armed assault on the British state in the Easter Rising in 1916. The rising itself was eventually quashed and sixteen of the main

[20] O'Leary, B. and McGarry, J., 2016. *The politics of antagonism: understanding Northern Ireland*. Bloomsbury Publishing.
[21] *Ibid.*
[22] Sutton, M. 2023. "Sutton Index of Deaths – Status Summary". Conflict Archive on the Internet. Available from: https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/sutton/tables/Status_Summary.html
[23] O'Leary, B. and McGarry, J., 2016. *The politics of antagonism: understanding Northern Ireland*. Bloomsbury Publishing.
[24] Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency., 2021. 2021 Census. Available from: https://www.nisra.gov.uk/statistics/census/2021-census
[25] O'Leary, B. and McGarry, J., 2016. *The politics of antagonism: understanding Northern Ireland*. Bloomsbury Publishing.

leaders were quickly arrested and executed for their participation in the events. It is argued that the quick decision of the British establishment to execute the leadership of the Irish republican movement involved in the rising, marked the beginning of widespread support for the Irish republican movement, "their acts of revolution apotheosized, and their memory enshrined in a well-established pantheon of nationalist martyrs".[26]

Following this first "protestant ascendancy", O'Leary and McGarry explain that the failure of Irish nationalists to persuade or coerce the protestant minority in the north of the island into a push for secession, is coupled with the failure of British unionists to fully integrate and consolidate their power in Ireland contributed to the "Northern Ireland" problem and subsequent partition of Ireland.[27] In 1921, Ireland was officially partitioned and the county of Ulster was officially recognised as a self-governing polity that would remain attached to the United Kingdom, whilst the remaining southern part of Ireland would be officially recognised as the "Irish free state" after the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty.[28] Since then, the push for secession in Northern Ireland from Irish Nationalists has been with the intention to reverse the process of partition and reunite Ireland fully and terminate any British political control on the island.

The use of violence was a defining feature of the troubles in Northern Ireland and so we must also address the actions of the various paramilitary groups that operated in the country, namely: the Irish Republican Army (IRA), Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and Ulster Defence Association (UDA). Whilst these paramilitary groups exercised armed violence against each other and innocent civilians, they (primarily republican paramilitaries) also acted against the British state which deployed its armed forces, along with specialist units of the Secret Air Service (SAS) on the streets of Northern Ireland to assist the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) in tackling this paramilitary offensive.

The IRA were the main republican paramilitary group that operated in Northern Ireland during the troubles. An important distinction should be made that the IRA itself was split in 1969, into the Provisional IRA (PIRA) and Official IRA over a disagreement on whether the organisation would continue the 'armed struggle', essentially the use of violence, against British control. This saw the PIRA become the "numerical and dominant faction in Northern Ireland, attracting younger recruits such as Gerry Adams in Belfast and Martin McGuinness in Derry", with its armed and violent mentality in the push for Irish reunification.[29] According to the Conflict Archive on the Internet (CAIN) the IRA was responsible for 1705 deaths or 48% of the total casualties during the troubles.[30]

Whilst the IRA and Republican paramilitaries were continuously involved in various bloody incidents, the British Army and RUC were also responsible for a large amount of violence and state terror against the catholic community in Northern Ireland. Firstly, catholics were subject to a variety of territorial, legal, electoral, economic and coercive control.[31] Throughout the mid 20th

[26] Beiner, G., 2007. Between trauma and triumphalism: The Easter Rising, the Somme, and the crux of deep memory in modern Ireland. *Journal of British Studies*, *46*(2), pp.366-389.
[27] *Ibid.*
[28] Lynch, R., 2019. *The partition of Ireland: 1918–1925*. Cambridge University Press.
[29] Shanahan, T., 2008. *Provisional Irish Republican Army and the Morality of Terrorism*. Edinburgh University Press.
[30] Sutton, M. 2023. "Sutton Index of Deaths – Status Summary". Conflict Archive on the Internet. Available from: https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/sutton/tables/Status_Summary.html
[31] O'Leary, B. and McGarry, J., 2016. *The politics of antagonism: understanding Northern Ireland*. Bloomsbury Publishing.

Century, The British state was accused of gerrymandering electoral boundaries to favour unionist candidates, prioritising the employment of unionist civilians, restricting state aid to catholic areas and intimidating Catholics in their own areas.[32] Furthermore, as the NI civil rights movement began to gather pace in the 1960's, many Catholics were burnt out of their homes through arson attacks, most noticeably in the "Burning of Bombay Street" in 1969.[33] Such intimidation and violence against the catholic community cannot be understated and acts as an important precursor to the violence that erupted after 1969. Furthermore, it is important to note that the British state did of course have a duty to comply with Human Rights law and safeguard the wellbeing of citizens within its borders. Many would argue that they were unsuccessful in this regard and so legitimised the armed struggle waged against them, whilst others will argue that the British state simply had to act in the ways it did to protect the citizens that had their support and punish those that vowed to act fatally against them. With this in mind, one can observe the differences in approach from both the Republican movement and the British state forces however one common feature was the violence conducted between each faction and the remorseful loss of civilian life as a result of such actions.

2. Cyprus

In many ways Cyprus has followed a similar trajectory as Northern Ireland, especially in the 20th Century where ethnic rivalry, paramilitarism and partition have been defining features of both countries. Furthermore, much of the conflict of the 20th Century can be explained by historical territorial claims across the island and how these events can be translated to the present day. Like Northern Ireland, Cyprus is currently divided along ethnic lines, with Greek Cypriots making up approximately 73% of the population, residing almost exclusively in the "government controlled" or "southern" part of the island, whilst in the Turkish controlled Northern Republic of Cyprus, Turkish Cypriots constitute approximately 300,000 people or 27% of the population of the island.[34] Due to the security situation in Cyprus it is difficult to assess the full demographic profile however speaking in approximate terms, it is very clear to observe a considerable Greek Cypriot majority existing in the internationally recognised southern part of the island and a modest Turkish minority in the north. With this in mind, it is interesting to assess the conflict between the two ethnic groups, firstly as the Greek majority maintain such a sizeable advantage in terms of population and how that obfuscates potential peace agreements, but also how the Northern Turkish region has acted in the last fifty years to resist any moves towards reunification of the island. The reasons as such will be explained throughout the following section.

Similar to the situation in Northern Ireland, we must look back as far as the 16th Century to understand the origins of this conflict. From the mid 1500s, the Ottoman empire enjoyed control over Cyprus for around 300 years until 1878 when Greek calls for "enosis", which called for the union of Cyprus with Greece, had been slowly gathering pace and the British Government had assumed control of the island.[35] This was proceeding at the same time that Turkish nationalism

[32] Hewitt, C., 1981. Catholic grievances, Catholic nationalism and violence in Northern Ireland during the civil rights period: A reconsideration. *British Journal of Sociology*, *32*(3), pp.362-380.

[33] https://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/the-burning-of-bombay-street-the-start-of-the-combustible-years-1.3986347

[34] Cypriot Ministry of Finance (2019), *Demographic Statistics 2019*, Nicosia: Ministry of Finance.

[35] Papadakis, Y., 2008. Narrative, memory and history education in divided Cyprus: A comparison of schoolbooks on the "History of Cyprus". *History & Memory*, *20*(2), pp.128-148.

was also intensifying in Cyprus and calls for "taksim", essentially the partition of Cyprus into two separate states, had also gathered considerable pace.[36] This culture of taksim vs enosis had been a gradual process that had ultimately been exacerbated by the rule of the United Kingdom that chose to prioritise the two World Wars and control of the commonwealth, rather than listening to concerns for self-determination. After World War II Greek and Turkish Cypriots built up respective support for enosis and taksim, particularly through youth movements and demonstrations, representing the new generation of young Cypriots passionate about the future of their island. Continued dissatisfaction with British control and fear of Greek and Turkish nationalism respectively, led the situation in Cyprus to become increasingly unstable with continued "student demonstrations, bomb explosions, inflammatory speeches and newspaper articles and rumours concerning the formation of armed groups within both communities".[37]

Again, similar to the situation in Northern Ireland, the deep-rooted enmity between both groups took a more sinister turn and a paramilitary presence was introduced to the conflict. "In 1955 the Greek Cypriot struggle was led by an armed organisation called EoKA (National organisation of Cypriot Fighters), and in 1958 Turkish Cypriots set up their own armed group called TMT (Turkish resistance organisation)".[38] EOKA began its campaign, primarily to challenge the British occupation and attempt to bring the issue to the international stage in the hope that such exposure would begin a process of diplomacy to bring about enosis. EOKA attacked police stations, public buildings and installations and sabotaged various monuments and memorials across the country in order to amplify their message against British rule.[39] It should be noted that "Greek Cypriot militants did not at first harm Turks, or even consider them as a possible obstacle to their struggle. They assumed that once enosis was achieved, the Turkish minority would still be a Turkish minority within a Greek Cyprus, enjoying security and all the other acknowledged minority rights".[40] From the outset, this approach seemed positive, however, Turkish Cypriots who were exposed to the violent attacks by Greek Cypriots, felt increasingly less comfortable with the prospect of living as a minority in an hostile Greek state that viewed enosis as the only suitable outcome.

In response to the violence imposed by EOKA, TMT was established, alongside the auxiliary police force, filled mostly by Turkish Cypriots and headed by the British, to resist the campaign being waged against them. As EOKA's campaign grew more and more violent, less British jobs were being distributed to Greek Cypriots and were mainly given to ethnic Turks. This enticed more violence and by 1958 Cyprus was on the verge of civil war. The situation had evolved into an inter-communal stand-off between Greek Cypriots vying for enosis and anyone who opposed it, and Turkish Cypriots who were mobilised into defending their position on the island and had been forced into responding to the violence in the same manner.

With the situation becoming increasingly untenable, talks were held in 1958 about the possible peaceful solution to the Cyprus problem. The following year, two crucial conferences, known as the Zurich-London conferences, were held and an agreement between Greek and Turkish Cypriots was signed, paving the way for the country to be declared as an independent, constitutional republic whereby a consociational arrangement would be put in place, ensuring a Greek Cypriot

[36] *Ibid.*
[37] Stavrinides, Z., 1975. *The Cyprus conflict: national identity and statehood.* Eastern Mediterranean University. p.46.
[38] *Ibid.*
[39] *Ibid.*
[40] *Ibid.*

President and Turkish Vice President, both of which were granted a final veto to override laws passed by the House of Representatives and Council of Ministers, of which three ministers were Turkish and seven to be Greek.[41] Most importantly, the constitution provided three treaties: the Treaty of Guarantee which aimed to preserve the consociational nature of the constitution and establish Britain, Greece and Turkey as guarantor powers, the Treaty of Establishment which defined the territory of Cyprus not including the two established UK military bases on the island, and the Treaty of Alliance which allowed both Turkey and Greece to have a small military presence on the island of which Greece was allocated 950 men and Turkey 650 respectively. [42]

Ultimately, the consociational arrangement that was agreed in 1960 lasted just three years, mainly due to Greek dissatisfaction to the system which they viewed only as a prelude to "enosis" rather than a long-term functioning political apparatus. In 1963, intercommunal violence once again erupted after constitutional reforms put forward by the Greek Cypriot President, Archbishop Makarios, were rejected by the Turkish and could only be repressed by the introduction of an intermediary peacekeeping force, organised by Great Britain, established in December 1963, which was later formally replaced by the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) in March 1964.[43]

3. Similarities and Differences

There are many striking similarities in the recent history of both Cyprus and Northern Ireland, most overtly through the use of violence by paramilitary organisations, intent on either defending the status quo or challenging the state forces that were in power at the time. From this perspective the violent campaign waged by the IRA in many ways mirrors the struggle launched by EOKA in Cyprus not only as both organisations used violence as a means to achieve their political goals, but also in the sense that British rule was an obstacle to their objectives. Furthermore, the reasons behind the violence in both countries are similar. In both Cyprus and Northern Ireland, there is a clear ethnically charged divide between two communities. In Cyprus ethnic Greeks oppose ethnic Turks, whilst in Northern Ireland, catholic republicans oppose loyalist protestants. In this instance a clear difference can be observed in that the demographics of the two communities in each country differ. In Northern Ireland, an approximate divide of 45% republican and 55% unionist is apparent whilst in Cyprus, Greek Cypriots control the majority of the island whilst Turkish Cypriots find themselves in the considerable minority. This of course brings major consequences and difficulties to the adoptability of a consociational, or alternative, political arrangement. This is a perspective that will be covered in chapter D.

Another similarity between the two countries is the splits in opinion over the future of both islands during their respective struggles. In Cyprus, President Makarios began his campaign as a keen "enosist" yet became increasingly moderate in his views, eventually settling for a campaign of Cypriot independence, arguably due to the pressure put on him from Great Britain during the Zurich-London agreements. Similarly, in Ireland, the Home Rule movement, intent on securing Irish rule within the state of Great Britain, faced opposition from the Republican movement, intent

[41] Hadjipavlou, M., 2007. The Cyprus conflict: Root causes and implications for peacebuilding. *Journal of Peace Research*, *44*(3), pp.349-365.

[42] Ker-Lindsay, J., 2011. *The Cyprus problem: What everyone needs to know*. Oxford University Press on Demand.

[43] Ker-Lindsay, J., 2009. "A history of Cyprus peace proposals" In: Andrekos Varnava and Hubert Faustmann, eds., *Reunifying Cyprus: the Annan Plan and Beyond*, pp.10-22. IB Tauris.

on securing full independence and establishment of an Irish republic. From one perspective, it could be argued that these disagreements within the anti-establishment camps of both countries hindered the overall objectives of both, as the lack of uniformity in their approach made their campaigns arguably less formidable and more ineffective. From another perspective, one could argue that there was uniformity in their respective campaigns against British rule, but that the context of relaxing these aspirations in a more measured and gradual process from Archbishop Makarios and the Home Rule movement against the fully powered engagements of EOKA and the IRA were inevitable manifestations of each respective political struggle.

D) Peace Agreements: Northern Ireland vs Cyprus

1. Adoptability of Power-Sharing Agreements

Before a power-sharing arrangement can be implemented or even proposed, there has to be an element of "adoptability" agreed upon in order for it to be successful. What is meant by adoptability is to what extent the negotiating parties involved in bringing about a peace agreement can agree upon acceptable conditions, that satisfy both groups and can be used as the basis to move forward upon in negotiating. Essentially adoptability can be viewed as a precondition, necessary for successful implementation of power-sharing. McEvoy and Aboultaif (2020) refer to adoptability as "the extent to which the groups support the establishment of a power-sharing polity".[44] Naturally, this explanation leads us to understand that the engagement and willingness of elites is paramount to a power-sharing agreement being successful before negotiation is even considered.

In the case of Cyprus, McGarry explains:

"Adoptability refers to the prospects of centripetal or consociational institutions being acceptable to both parties and communities in Cyprus, rather than the prospects of these institutions being "adopted," that is, put in place. For power-sharing institutions to be adopted, a settlement is needed which might require agreement on additional matters not directly related to power-sharing institutions."[45]

These additional matters are relevant for the cases of both Cyprus, where security and property matters are needed to be agreed upon, and in the case of Northern Ireland, prisoner release, demilitarisation and decommissioning were important additional matters that were successfully dealt with and contributed to the success of the Good Friday Agreements implementation. Of the major parties involved, only the DUP did not support the Good Friday Agreement, which showed that the strong elite engagement and willingness to cooperate among the other parties was paramount to the success of the peace agreement.

[44] McEvoy, J. and Aboultaif, E.W., 2022. Power-sharing challenges: From weak adoptability to dysfunction in Iraq. *Ethnopolitics*, *21*(3), pp.238-257.

[45] McGarry, J., 2017. Centripetalism, consociationalism and Cyprus: The "adoptability" question. *Political Studies*, *65*(2), pp.512-529.

2. The Sunningdale Agreement

Three major negotiations, of which two were successfully agreed upon, and one that achieved the ultimate goal of peace and a lasting democratic process established in Northern Ireland, can be categorised as the main negotiations that defined the Northern Ireland Peace Process. Firstly, the Sunningdale Agreement was a first attempt at establishing a power-sharing executive in Northern Ireland and cross border consultation between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. McGarry and O'Leary note that "consociational theory has been a central part of Northern Ireland's 'meta-conflict' and that the "power-sharing experiment" of the Sunningdale Agreement, showed that the principles of consociationalism were present but not executed in an "appropriate or adoptable manner".[46] It is this principle of adoptability that is a fundamental aspect of implementing power-sharing institutions and why the Sunningdale Agreement failed to be executed. Essentially, the Sunningdale Agreement failed to fully address the issue of self-determination for Irish Nationalists, effectively recognising both identities in Northern Ireland and effective cross-border and inter-island cooperation.

Keeping the issue of adoptability in mind, the contextual factors surrounding the Sunningdale Agreement help to explain why it failed. At the time, the Unionist party system was divided, and the ominous rise of the DUP who vehemently opposed the agreement, applied pressure on the UUP who held the balance of Unionist power in Northern Ireland at the time. To further complicate matters, the situation in the Republic of Ireland was also becoming increasingly complex. Not only was the vague wording of the agreement a significant problem for its implementation, in January 1974, the Irish Constitutional court ruled against the compatibility of the agreement in that it violated the Irish constitution by stating the existence of Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom.[47] It is important to note that the Irish Constitution did not actually recognise the existence of Northern Ireland until the Good Friday Agreement in 1998 when the constitution was amended to reflect this.

One important distinction to consider with the Sunningdale Agreement is that it very closely resembled the Good Friday Agreement that was signed in 1998, which indicates that the content of the agreement was not necessarily the primary reason why it failed to bring peace, but that the external influences and context of the situation in the 1970s did not create suitable conditions for successful implementation. The political situation in Northern Ireland preluding the Sunningdale Agreement was dire. In 1971 the British Government launched Operation Demetrius, allowing the forced arrest and internment of any individuals suspected of paramilitary involvement. This was a highly unpopular policy that was eventually revoked in 1975 but severely affected how the British Government was viewed, particularly by nationalists and so had knock on effects on the adoptability of the Sunningdale Agreement being signed and implemented.[48] Further to this, the Provisional IRA had been established in 1969 and aimed to continue its armed struggle against British occupation. The most intense period of violence conducted by the provisional IRA was from its inception in 1969 through to 1974, again highlighting the specific contextual and external factors that affected the adoptability of the Sunningdale agreement.

[46] McGarry, J. and O'Leary, B., 2006. *Consociational Theory, Northern Ireland's Conflict, and its Agreement. Part 1: What Consociationalists Can Learn from Northern Ireland*. Blackwell Publishing.
[47] *Ibid.*
[48] *Ibid.*

It is also important to address the debate surrounding consociationalism in Northern Ireland from the period of the Sunningdale Agreement onwards, as it essentially created the bulk of the framework evident in the Good Friday Agreement, and the consociational principles that have guided lasting peace in Northern Ireland since 1998. McGarry and O'Leary argue that Pierre Van den Berghe's five forms of democracy have been tested in Northern Ireland since the pre-partition era, but it is the essence of consociational democracy that has not only suited Northern Ireland the best but has been the only lasting solution to conflict in the country.[49]

3. The Good Friday Agreement

Looking at the Good Friday Agreement we can now compare how and if the debate surrounding consociationalism had changed since Sunningdale, as well as the inherent characteristics of the 1998 agreement and how they have contributed to lasting peace. As mentioned before, the Sunningdale Agreement provided the main framework for the Good Friday Agreement and both provided for Lijphart's four main consociational features: a grand coalition, proportional representation, minority veto rights and segmental autonomy. The Good Friday Agreement updated the voluntary coalition provided in Sunningdale by establishing an executive through the D'hondt method, continued the proportional representation of citizens through the Single Transferable Vote system, provided a minority veto through the petition of concern and allowed for segmental autonomy through both integrated and religiously defined schooling and recognition of language rights.[50]

The establishment of the Northern Ireland executive through the D'hondt method has allowed a proportional distribution of power through the decision-making wing of the assembly and has also accommodated an important aspect of power-sharing within Northern Irish politics. Through D'hondt, a first and deputy first minister are elected with identical powers, along with ten other ministerial offices on a "basis of succession upon the highest average of seats in the assembly".[51] In comparison to Sunningdale, where the grand coalition was voluntary, the Good Friday Agreement accommodated more in terms of proportional representation, and thus it can be argued that this made the agreement more conditioned to adoptability which is evidenced through its lasting legacy since 1998. Whilst this is true to a large extent, the agreement also allowed for the collapse of the executive if either of the first or deputy first ministers resigned. This has in turn contributed to periods of political deadlock most notably in recent years with the resignation of Deputy First Minister Martin McGuinness in 2017 over the RHI scandal and First Minister Paul Givan in 2022 over the Northern Ireland Protocol. To some degree this allows individual ethnic groups to hold the executive to ransom and highlights an inherent weakness in the design of the Good Friday Agreement.[52] Further to this, when First Minister Peter Robinson "stepped aside" in

[49] McGarry, J. and O'Leary, B., 2004. *The Northern Ireland conflict: consociational engagements,* pp.323-351. Oxford University Press.

[50] *Ibid.*

[51] Northern Ireland Assembly, *Allocation of seats in the Assembly Executive and Chairs and Deputy Chairs of Committees, D'hondt method*, UK, Available from: https://archive.niassembly.gov.uk/io/summary/d%27hondt.htm

[52] Heenan, D. and Birrell, D., 2022. Exploring Responses to the Collapse of Devolution in Northern Ireland 2017–2020 through the Lens of Multi-Level Governance. *Parliamentary Affairs*, *75*(3), pp.596-615.

2016 he was able to install Arlene Foster as acting first minister and stop the process of elections being called, thus exposing a loophole in the D'hondt method.[53]

It should also be noted that the political situation in Northern Ireland today is far from secure. Presently, the DUP is protesting parliament by refusing to nominate a speaker in the house and thus forcing the legislative body into deadlock. The reason for this is due to the DUP's rejection of the Northern Ireland Protocol and argument that a hybrid sea border has been created because of this legislation. Such a move by the DUP further emphasises the delicacy of balancing the finely tuned institutional arrangement in Northern Ireland whilst also respecting the Good Friday Agreement. As Kelly et al (2023) argue, better incorporation of the North-South and East-West institutions could normalise relations between the three governments, and ultimately foster better cooperation and a pathway to compromise.

The inclusion of a minority veto through the petition of concern is another way in which the Good Friday Agreement improved upon the initial attempts to bring a consociational arrangement to Northern Ireland in the Sunningdale Agreement. There is also the inclusion of parallel consent and weighted majorities that intend to protect minorities, however there is the possibility that those that designate as "other" in the assembly "could be outvoted by either Nationalists or Unionists or a Nationalist-Unionist supermajority".[54] Minority rights are also protected in the courts with both Nationalists and Unionists able to take their individual matters to the legal level, as well as the fact that the agreement was signed under the duress of the European Court of Human Rights and that any attempt to remove Northern Ireland from this process would be in breach of the agreement itself.[55] This last point has come into contention recently with the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union and subsequent threats of the British executive of withdrawing from the European Convention of Human Rights.

Whilst minority veto rights and proportional representation were updated to reflect the specific contextual constraints in Northern Ireland in 1998, the remaining two consociational characteristics, segmental autonomy and grand coalition, were already features established in the Sunningdale Agreement and simply redefined in the Good Friday Agreement. Furthermore, segmental autonomy was updated in relation to contextual factors whereby the education system would provide equal funding to protestant, catholic and integrated schools and language rights for both Ulster Scots and Gaelic would be respected.[56] In effect the Good Friday Agreement successfully accommodated Lijphart's four consociational features whilst updating some of these features to respect the specific contextual pressures arising from ethnic cleavages at that time.

Whilst highlighting the consociational characteristics of the Good Friday Agreement we should also note that these characteristics alone were not exclusively responsible for peace being achieved. The agreement also included the establishment of "inter-state institutions, policing reform, prisoner release, demilitarisation, and the decommissioning of paramilitary weapons".[57] It is these auxiliary reforms that have been just as crucial as the consociational nature of the Good Friday Agreement in bringing peace to Northern Ireland. O'Leary and McGarry note that the

[53] McGarry, J. and O'Leary, B., 2016. Power-sharing executives: Consociational and centripetal formulae and the case of Northern Ireland. *Ethnopolitics*, *15*(5), pp.497-519.
[54] McGarry, J. and O'Leary, B., 2004. *The Northern Ireland conflict: consociational engagements,* pp 323-351. Oxford University Press.
[55] *Ibid.*
[56] *Ibid.*
[57] *Ibid.*

complexity of the situation in Northern Ireland highlighted that not only are favourable conditions necessary for the application of a consociational arrangement, but also that exterior, contextual influences can coerce extra reforms or accommodations to achieve peace.[58] Certainly, in Northern Ireland this has been imperative in achieving peace and when looking at the case of Cyprus we can compare the situations to see if it is something that was implemented or could be implemented in the future.

Whilst these external contextual issues were important in advancing the peace process, there is one external contextual factor in particular that stands out as an absolutely crucial aspect of the situation in Northern Ireland. The role of international external actors was crucial to the peace process being successful and this will be covered fully in chapter E.

4. The Road to the Annan Plan

After the failure of the consociational experiment in Cyprus from 1960-1963, the country entered a period of instability until 1974. The US began the attempts to resolve the problem with the Acheson plan in 1964, aiming to unite Cyprus with Greece whilst leaving a Turkish army base in the North and giving minority rights to Turkish Cypriots.[59] The plan was of course rejected by both groups leaving the country in deadlock with sporadic violence and various threats of invasion from Turkey until 1968 when intercommunal talks commenced. The first round focused on constitutional reform which Makarios flatly rejected, the second focused on local government and the final two rounds focused on constitutional reform again, however the negotiations were unsuccessful as neither side was able to acquiesce to an agreement.[60]

In 1974, the Greek government was now under military control and was opposed to Makarios' independence approach, rather than full enosis. Under this premise, the Greek government ordered troops to overthrow Makarios and install the "pro-enosis" leader, Nicos Sampson. Fearing the worst, Turkey officially invaded Cyprus in July 1974 as a response to the withdrawal of Makarios. The short-term effects of Turkey's invasion worked to disrupt the Greek operation as the military junta in Athens was toppled and in Cyprus Makarios was reinstalled as leader. The long-term effects proved more resourceful as Turkey was then able to unilaterally occupy 37% of the island and effectively divide the island politically and geographically.[61] It was from this point on that the future of Cyprus was called into question in more drastic terms. In 1977 the High-Level Agreement specified that any future settlement of Cyprus would be through a bi-zonal and bi-communal federation, thus destroying any hope for Greek enosis. Talks continued and more proposals were brought to the table, specifying how federation could work in the case of Cyprus, however Greek Cypriots mainly could not accept conditions that would increase Turkish territorial gains, whilst Turkish Cypriots struggled with the framework discussed for a central government, opting for a more confederal, rather than federal approach.[62]

Throughout the latter part of the 1970s and early 1980s negotiations continued on a bi-zonal and bi-communal federation but were not successful. By 1983 agreement looked unlikely and Turkey

[58] *Ibid.*

[59] Ker-Lindsay, J., 2009. "A history of Cyprus peace proposals" In: Andrekos Varnava and Hubert Faustmann, eds., *Reunifying Cyprus: the Annan Plan and Beyond*, pp.10-22. IB Tauris.

[60] *Ibid.*

[61] *Ibid.*

[62] *Ibid.*

decided to unilaterally declare the northern part of Cyprus as its own, naming it the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).[63] Talks surrounding a federal arrangement fluctuated between moving back to the ideas presented in the late 70s and the more recent proposals in the early 80s. This instability continued until Cyprus formally applied for membership of the European Community (later European Union). This move proved to be massively important in the short-term by upsetting the Turkish Cypriots and their leader Rauf Denktash who refused to cooperate on negotiations and further refused to cooperate with the UN, opting to deal with Greek Cypriots directly. In the long term, Cyprus' application to the EC/EU would prove costly during the Annan Plan negotiations in 2004.[64]

5. The Annan Plan

With the context of the previous 30 years in mind, we can now look at the Annan Plan and try to explain why it was unsuccessful. One of the main reasons why it did fail, was not because the framework proposed did not satisfy any consociational criteria, in fact much of the plan itself was not a new proposal but was a culmination of 30 years of trial and tribulation and the influence of exterior contextual stimuli. The main reason why the Annan Plan failed was due to its inability to address the security concerns that Greek Cypriots had towards Turkish Cypriots and the problem surrounding property rights as a result of the Turkish invasion in 1983.[65] As Yakinthou suggests:

"The decision to use consociational institutions was effectively made for the UN by the fact that little else would have been acceptable to both sides, and the solution's broad outline had been long established".[66]

This again suggests to us that the adoptability of the Annan Plan was the most important element at play during these negotiations. It was less important to focus on the likelihood of the plan being put in place, but more important at looking at the exterior disputable elements that could affect either side rejecting the plan. This also shows us that the contents of the Annan Plan were not new ideas, but were the result of a 30 year long struggle at attempting to bring Turkish and Greek Cypriots together and agree on a framework for peace. The plan aimed to establish a bi-zonal, bi-communal federal structure, much like the proposals put forward in the 1970s and 1980s. A crucial factor influencing the Annan negotiations to resemble past proposals was that "there were considerable periods in the past where one or both sides were not providing the UN with various negotiating positions required for the construction of a compromise solution".[67] The UN was hopeful that improved relations between the two sides and a more congenial government in Turkey would influence better negotiations.

Similar to the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland, the Annan Plan satisfied all four of Lijphart's consociational principles. Starting with grand coalition, the Annan Plan proposed a decentralised federation by reuniting Cyprus into the United Cyprus Republic.[68] Through this

[63] Mallinson, W., 2005. *Cyprus: A modern history*. Bloomsbury Publishing.
[64] Ker-Lindsay, J., 2009. "A history of Cyprus peace proposals" In: Andrekos Varnava and Hubert Faustmann, eds., *Reunifying Cyprus: the Annan Plan and Beyond*, pp.10-22. IB Tauris.
[65] Yakinthou, C., 2009. "Consociational Democracy and Cyprus: The House that Annan Built?" In Andrekos Varnava and Hubert Faustmann, ed., *Reunifying Cyprus: The Annan Plan and Beyond,* pp.23-38. IB Tauris.
[66] *Ibid.*
[67] *Ibid.*
[68] *Ibid.*

framework a Presidential Council would be elected, a Chamber of deputies and a federal administration. The Council was to be elected through a common list which incentivised inter-group alliance building and cooperation. Furthermore, "Moderate political behaviour amongst potential candidates would also have been encouraged by the need for bi-communal endorsement of the list in parliament".[69]

As for proportional representation, the party-list electoral system again shows how each ethnic group would be represented as it "encouraged compromise and the building of inter-group coalitions."[70] Cultural autonomy was then naturally achieved through the federal nature of the plan. Each constituent state had autonomy over education, culture and religious matters as well as residual powers such as "the allocation of citizenship based on language and limitations on the right of primary residence within the 'other' constituent state".[71] Similar to the Good Friday Agreement, proportional representation is a central theme in both agreements and highlights the need for such a characteristic when exploring consociational frameworks as a means of conflict resolution between two polarised ethnic groups.

The final characteristic to address is a minority veto. The minority veto element was important in order to suppress Turkish Cypriot fears that they would be oppressed by the Greek Cypriot majority. The thinking behind the minority veto was that "no decision could be taken by persons from one constituent state alone and that no single person could veto decisions or block the running of the state run like a golden thread throughout the plan".[72] Essentially the delicate introduction of the minority veto into the Annan Plan satisfied both Turkish and Greek Cypriot fears of either group dominating the other.

Whilst from a very measured analysis, solely looking from the consociational perspective from the aforementioned points, one would assume that the Annan Plan would have been a success. This however was not the case for a variety of reasons that focus mainly on the exterior contextual factors, primarily relating to Greek security concerns, property rights (concerning the internal displacement of both Turkish and Greek Cypriots after the 1974 invasion and lack of compensation since this date) and the problem with Cyprus entering the EU, regardless of whether an agreement would be concluded or not. It could also be argued that the plan focused too heavily on ethnicity as a driving factor behind electoral participation, citizenship and right of residence.[73] Again, these external factors are important in the Cypriot context, however it is the role of international external actors such as the EU, that were tremendously influential to the peace process in Cyprus and will be covered in the following chapter.

[69] *Ibid.*
[70] *Ibid.*
[71] *Ibid.*
[72] Annan, K., 'Report of Kofi Annan on Good Offices in Cyprus', *United Nations Document,* 1 April, 2003 UN doc S/2003/398.
[73] Yakinthou, C., 2009. "Consociational Democracy and Cyprus: The House that Annan Built?" In Andrekos Varnava and Hubert Faustmann, ed., *Reunifying Cyprus: The Annan Plan and Beyond,* pp.23-38. IB Tauris.

E) External Actors in Northern Ireland and Cyprus

1. The Role of External Actors in Northern Ireland

It is widely accepted that external actors, particularly superior superpowers such as the USA, have the potential to provide incentives that inevitably lead to the "internalisation and habitualisation of power-sharing as norm-conforming behaviour".[74] This is of course an ideal scenario and is usually most effective when such incentives "uphold a peace agreement that satisfies groups' structural preferences on constitutional issues".[75] Furthermore, according to McGarry, integration is typically the preferred power-sharing initiative proposed by external actors, however "experience shows that the international community has been prepared to back accommodation where that has been demanded, if only, and unfortunately, after rebellion has threatened order".[76] This is more so the case in Northern Ireland where vigilance and the ability to acquiesce were successful characteristics needed by both unionists and nationalists to accommodate each other's proposals but also those of the external actors, namely, the USA and the British and Irish governments.

One key aspect of the adoptability of the Good Friday Agreement was the implementation of both the Irish and British government as guarantor powers and north-south, east-west cooperation. This was further solidified through agreement on a compromise for self-determination that incentivised both nationalists and unionists:

"It is for the people of the island of Ireland alone, by agreement between the two parts respectively and without external impediment, to exercise their right of self-determination on the basis of consent, freely and concurrently given, North and South, to bring about a united Ireland, if that is their wish, accepting that this right must be achieved and exercised with and subject to the agreement and consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland".[77]

As we already mentioned, these incentives are more effective when they appease each group's constitutional preferences and certainly in this case both unionists and nationalists could be satisfied that neither of their constitutional objectives were being hindered by signing the agreement. For unionists, their status within the United Kingdom would remain so long as the majority in the country agreed and the violence they faced from the IRA would end. For nationalists, their wish for self-determination was now officially recognised and achievable through democratic means that could not be argued against with the use of violence. This incentive was large enough for the nationalist community to agree to the proposal and continue their struggle in a non-violent way. Finally, the Irish constitution was amended to recognise Northern Ireland's existence and that reunification was only possible through the mutual consent

[74] *Ibid.*

[75] *Ibid.*

[76] McGarry, J., O'Leary, B. and Simeon, R., 2008. "Integration or Accommodation? The Enduring Debate in Conflict Regulation" In S. Choudhry, ed., *Constitutional Design for Divided Societies,* pp.41-88. Oxford University Press.

[77] British–Irish Agreement (1998), 'Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Ireland', available from: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/agreement.htm#annex.

of both countries, again giving incentives and accommodation to both communities involved in the process from an external actor.[78]

Whilst the role of the British and Irish governments were advantageous in advancing negotiations in the Good Friday Agreement, arguably the role of the USA in advancing the peace talks was just as influential. Given the global political context at the beginning of the 1990s, "The end of superpower rivalry between the USA and USSR allowed the United States to ignore its "Special Relationship" with the UK and interfere in the internal affairs of its closest ally".[79] Essentially, the USA, with no apparent global opponent, began to export its norms and bring peace to a range of conflict situations throughout Europe in the 1990s, one of course being the Northern Ireland conflict. It must be stressed however that the involvement of the USA in the Northern Ireland conflict furthered the "pan-nationalist" argument far more than it did the "pan-unionist" argument, however unionists were quick to understand the importance of incorporating international voices into the conversation that could persuade an increasingly non-cooperative Sinn Fein to agree to the proposals put forward in the Good Friday Agreement.[80]

The USA also provided incentives through economic investment conditional on improving peace negotiations. The International Fund for Ireland was an initiative set up by the United States that aimed to provide crucial funding for the country if peace efforts could be committed to. Furthermore, the USA was involved in facilitating the peace talks, most importantly through US Special Envoy George Mitchell who mediated talks between both communities representatives and was instrumental in bringing together officials from Northern Ireland, the United Kingdom and Republic of Ireland, through his own experience as a diplomat and through the political clout that the USA had when it came to mediating such an arrangement.[81] Again, the influence of the USA on peace negotiations made the Good Friday Agreement adoptable through appeasing nationalist demands but also providing a pan-nationalist identity that would reinforce their struggle and incentivise their commitment to peace and a non-violent continuation of their constitutional struggle.

A final aspect to consider when looking at the role of external actors in peace negotiations is the approach that they take. In the case of Northern Ireland, external actors have taken both a "light touch and hard touch"[82] approach when providing incentives to groups and each method typically has the same goal, however the method in which it is demonstrated differs greatly. The light touch approach is generally a more favourable process as it focuses on external actors "convening inter-party negotiations and sometimes providing technical expertise on institutional reform and even drafting the text of an agreement".[83] Such an approach is more likely to avoid upsetting any of the participating groups and is more appropriate for when negotiations are at a stalemate but not at a crisis point in which violence may resume. The light touch approach can be exemplified by the St Andrews Agreement in 2006 where both the British and Irish Governments proposed a set

[78] McEvoy, J., 2014. The role of external actors in incentivizing post-conflict power-sharing. *Government and Opposition*, *49*(1), pp.47-69.
[79] Dixon, P., 2006. Performing the Northern Ireland peace process on the world stage. *Political Science Quarterly*, *121*(1), pp.61-91.
[80] *Ibid.*
[81] *Ibid.*
[82] McCulloch, A. and McEvoy, J., 2019. 'Bumps in the Road Ahead': How External Actors Defuse Power-Sharing Crises. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, *13*(2), pp.216-235.
[83] *Ibid.*

of proposals focused on institutional reform and a timeline for an Irish language act. The agreement helped calm Unionist fears surrounding the devolution of policing and justice whilst also moving Sinn Fein to commit to the idea of finally supporting policing in Northern Ireland. The adaptability of the Northern Ireland Agreement is evident here as in its initial form it was set up to accommodate multiple future outcomes as well as work towards reshaping policy in Northern Ireland. As the St Andrews talks proved, the Good Friday Agreement could be adapted and reformed to maintain peace and cooperation between the two ethnic groups.[84] This was ultimately achieved through the "light touch approach".

Similarly, the hard touch approach has been used in Northern Ireland as well, more so in situations where one group is being non-compliant and requires an ultimatum to force their hand in the situation. Such a situation can be exemplified by Peter Mandelson in 2000 "who introduced a suspension order, used to adjourn the institutions and prevent the collapse of power-sharing in the event that Ulster Unionist leader David Trimble resign in the absence of IRA decommissioning".[85] In this sense, Mandelson saw the potential outcome of the Northern Ireland Assembly collapsing if the IRA did not begin decommissioning their weapons and so capitalised on his position by threatening Sinn Fein that the failure would be blamed on them. Situations like this show where the heavy touch approach is also beneficial to maintaining power-sharing arrangements when necessary. A balance of both the heavy touch and soft touch approaches has been used in Northern Ireland, the latter of which proving the adaptability of the Good Friday Agreement, and has ultimately been conducive to the lasting peace and relative stability in the region since 1998.

With this in mind, the same cannot be said for Cyprus as an agreement has not been settled. When comparing Northern Ireland to Cyprus it is evident that Northern Ireland managed to evade the problem of adoptability, with which Cyprus has been suffering throughout the peace process, but has also been able to adapt to future obstacles through enforcing "soft touch" and "hard touch" methods in maintaining peace. This failure to answer the problem of adoptability in Cyprus is what will be analysed next, in order to understand why Northern Ireland has been successful in achieving and maintaining peace and Cyprus has not.

2. The Role of External Actors in Cyprus

As we have discovered that the intervention of international actors was very important in the adoptability of the Good Friday Agreement, we must now compare this situation in Cyprus. From this perspective there are a range of actors to analyse, namely: the UN and the European Union. Firstly, we will look at the role of the United Nations.

The UN has had a considerable input on the peace process in Cyprus. As we have already mentioned, the UN peacekeeping force was established on the island in 1964 which aimed to bring stability to the conflict and oversee the ceasefire. This peacekeeping force remains on the island to this day, which to many can be considered both a positive and negative. On one hand it represents a failure to come to a peace agreement over the last sixty years but also, it shows that the UN has been able to maintain its presence on the island and contribute to stability and lower levels of perceived violence than there would be without their presence.

[84] *Ibid.*
[85] *Ibid.*

The UN has also been involved in numerous negotiations, most notably the Annan Plan in 2004. As well as this, UN led on a mediating level in the Zurich-London agreements in 1959-1960, the intercommunal talks in the late 1960s and the high level agreement in 1977 that decided the future of Cyprus should be based upon the establishment of a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation.[86] To this regard, the UN has been very involved and a positive force in the progression of negotiations, much like the US was in Northern Ireland. Since the agreement on a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation as the optimal structure to overcome the Cypriot problem, the main problem for the UN has been overcoming the perception that the conflict is intractable due to the historical mistrust between both groups on the island and the security concerns that arise from that.

The EU has also had a considerable influence on the peace process in Cyprus. This influence can be most notably characterised by the EU's enlargement process and the accession of Cyprus to the union. The premise behind Cyprus' accession to EU was that there was the potential for conflict resolution through this process.[87] The EU however took quite a hard line approach to the process, most notably in 1997 when the EU Commission stated that it would continue with Cyprus' accession regardless of an outcome on peace negotiations on the island.[88] To this extent it can be argued that the EU prioritised its own enlargement process over the peace process on the island of Cyprus. It also poses the question: Was the EU really intent on providing assistance in the form of conflict resolution to Cyprus? Or were there alternative objectives? Certainly, the EU appeared to side with Greek Cypriots to this extent as it stated that "if a settlement were not reached before EU accession negotiations were due to begin, they should be opened with the Greek Cypriots – the 'Republic of Cyprus' being the only internationally recognized authority on the island".[89] In response, Turkey withdrew from the UN led peace negotiations and demanded that the north of the island be recognised internationally. The final blow also came when Turkey was rejected candidate status as the 1997 Luxembourg council summit.[90]

EU accession negotiations with Cyprus continued, and by 2004, the country officially became a member of the European Union. The EU did of course propose and commit to providing many incentives to Turkey such as trade concessions and financial aid in return for more cooperation on the peace process. To what extent this was effective in contributing to the peace process is up for debate however, most notably the EU's "hard touch" approach by siding with the Greek Cypriots certainly had a considerable influence on frustrating Turkish Cypriots and forcing them to reconsider their negotiating position consistently. It should also be noted that "the EU became a primary party to the Cyprus conflict by bringing the conflict within its own jurisdiction".[91] Whilst the accession of Cyprus to the EU was damaging to the Turkish Cypriot negotiating position, ultimately the external contextual issues, primarily security concerns and property rights were major sticking points for the peace process progressing. The EU believed that its enlargement campaign was a mechanism for applying conflict resolution measures, however the

[86] Ker-Lindsay, J., 2009. "A history of Cyprus peace proposals" In: Andrekos Varnava and Hubert Faustmann, eds., *Reunifying Cyprus: the Annan Plan and Beyond*, pp.10-22. IB Tauris.
[87] Eralp, D.U. and Beriker, N., 2005. Assessing the conflict resolution potential of the EU: The Cyprus conflict and accession negotiations. *Security dialogue*, *36*(2), pp.175-192.
[88] *Ibid.*
[89] *Ibid.*
[90] *Ibid.*
[91] *Ibid.*

accession of Cyprus simply proved that the EU had simply adopted an unfinished and seemingly intractable conflict within its own borders.

The interesting comparison here is that international influence and pressure was highly effective in Northern Ireland to progress peace negotiations, however in Cyprus it has been less successful. This is not to say that international influence was completely ineffective, certainly, the influence of the UN and EU has been tremendous and has contributed to moving peace negotiations forward, however, the problem has been overcoming the internal disputes and how the complexity of these issues make the conflict appear almost intractable. In Northern Ireland, the Sunningdale Agreement set up the majority of the framework needed for institutional change and was completed with the Good Friday Agreement, complimented with huge commitments from the UK, Irish and American governments. In Cyprus, the framework for peace was also agreed early on with the high-level agreement and it was hoped that it could be completed with the signing of the Annan Plan in 2004. As we have mentioned, Cyprus' accession to the EU had major ramifications to the peace process and unfortunately security concerns and property rights were two issues that could not be accommodated successfully.

F) Future Obstacles for Northern Ireland and Cyprus

1. Is Brexit Affecting Adaptability in Northern Ireland?

One of the key factors that has enabled the Good Friday Agreement to continue to be adaptable is the lack of definition on the indicators that should be used to determine exactly when a border referendum should occur.[92] Because of this however, opinion is naturally divided on when this referendum will occur, yet the calamity of Brexit has been a considerable contributor in shifting demographics and making a referendum more likely. The large majority of citizens in Northern Ireland voted to remain within the European Union, however as Northern Ireland is only one part of a union of states, the overall UK vote was in favour of leaving. This is a central argument put forward by Nationalists, of which all parties that designate this way, did not support the DUP or the Conservative government intent on withdrawing the UK from the European Union. It is even suggested that moderate unionists would be willing to sacrifice their vote to a nationalist party in order to retain the benefits of membership of the European Union.[93] This not only contributes to a perceived expectation that demographics within Northern Ireland are likely to be altered due to the result of the Brexit referendum but also that serious consideration must be given to the prospect of a referendum on Irish unity.

It is also important to look at the basis and context upon which the Good Friday Agreement was signed. As Hayward and Phinnemore argue:

"It is indisputable that common EU membership for the UK and Ireland provided an essential context for this arrangement and its effective implementation. The Agreement was premised on the assumption of common policies and interests across a wide range of policy areas. UK withdrawal from the EU means that the trajectories of the UK and Ireland will now diverge. This

[92] Cooley, L., 2021. Census politics in Northern Ireland from the Good Friday Agreement to Brexit: Beyond the 'sectarian headcount'?. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, *23*(3), pp.451-470.
[93] *Ibid.*

divergence will be wide-ranging and will happen in law, trade, security, rights, policies and politics".[94]

Certainly, in 1998, Ireland and the UK shared many common interests with membership of the European Union being central to this. One of the most crucial aspects of this divergence in policy and interest is based around trade. The Northern Ireland protocol has been a major sticking point for the DUP who insist that they are being controlled by a "foreign entity" and believe an internal UK border is being created due to the checks and processes being enforced on goods entering Northern Ireland from the UK. The reason such checks have to occur is because the Republic of Ireland remains in the European Union but no hard border is maintained on the island, meaning that the UK could hypothetically send goods to Northern Ireland and have them transported to the Republic of Ireland unchecked. The protocol was designed to overcome this but has been met with serious resistance from the unionist majority. The maintenance of the soft border in Northern Ireland is central to the maintenance of peace on the island and so poses the question: is Brexit and the issue over the protocol causing a serious issue for the sustainability of the Good Friday Agreement?

Hayward and Phinnemore argue that "it is possible to enable the continued operation of all-island markets and of cross-border supply chains. It is also possible to secure access to different forms of EU cooperation for both jurisdictions on the island of Ireland".[95] With this in mind, many point to underutilisation of the intergovernmental "East-West" and "North-South" institutions set up with the signing of the Good Friday Agreement and how more than ever, these institutions are needed to resolve the issue of Brexit. Furthermore, as Tannam argues:

"Once Article 50 was triggered in March 2017, the Irish government as part of the 27 member state EU negotiating team and the UK government were not on the same side, for the first time in decades. The Irish government was not free to bargain unilaterally with the UK, even if the UK requested it. Thus, both governments could not share information in the way they once did".[96]

Bearing this in mind, a considerable recommendation from the scholarly research on the effects of Brexit on Northern Ireland contends that the use of the intergovernmental forums set up with the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, namely the British-Irish Council and the North-South ministerial council, should be utilised more in order to facilitate negotiations that contribute to upholding the agreement even in the face of the diverging interests of the British and Irish governments.

Another mounting threat exacerbated by Brexit is the possibility of violence occurring as a result of a border referendum being applied for by nationalists in Northern Ireland. Stevenson alludes to the return to a hard border on the island may revive the old "well-rehearsed" patterns last seen during the violent period of the troubles.[97] Further to this, the threat level in Northern Ireland has been temporarily raised a handful of times since the Brexit referendum result as many violent attacks and protests have occurred, mainly from Unionists opposing the Northern Ireland

[94] Hayward, K. and Phinnemore, D., 2017. *This Brexit juncture is a critical moment for the Good Friday Agreement*. LSE Brexit.
[95] *Ibid.*
[96] Tannam, E., 2018. Intergovernmental and cross-border civil service cooperation: The Good Friday Agreement and Brexit. *Ethnopolitics, 17*(3), pp.243-262.
[97] Stevenson, J., 2017. Does Brexit Threaten Peace in Northern Ireland?. *Survival*, *59*(3), pp.111-128.

protocol.[98] The rising incidents of violence across Northern Ireland as a result of the Brexit referendum are a major concern for the Northern Irish executive however, whilst Stormont remains suspended due to the DUP's opposition to the protocol, it is assumed that now more than ever, political will must be shown by all groups involved to come to an agreement for the future of the island. This also highlights the importance of the intergovernmental institutions set up in 1998 and how they could be instrumental to providing an arena that could contribute to successful negotiations on the issue.

2. Is There a Prospect of Adoptability in Cyprus?

The current situation in Cyprus shows us that there has been an unsuccessful attempt at providing conditions favourable to the adoption of a power-sharing administration. The Annan Plan included provisions for the continued presence of Turkish troops on the island which of course led Greek Cypriots to be fearful. Furthermore, the proposed mechanism for addressing property rights for displaced persons was also rejected by Greek Cypriots who were not in favour of the plans. Greek Cypriots believed that the restitution mechanism and issues over property exchange were unfair and only reinforced the division of the island. These exterior contextual issues exist in the same way in Northern Ireland, on issues such as prisoner release, policing and justice and language issues, however in Cyprus, they were not dealt with adequately. It should be noted that these issues are divisive and not all communities will accept that they have been or were dealt with sufficiently. Most importantly, the victims' families continue to have strong views against the issue of prisoner release and nationalists will argue that Irish language rights have not been implemented in Northern Ireland.

McGarry identifies three forms of government that Cyprus could approach in the future and whether or not they are adoptable.[99] Firstly McGarry deals with a presidential versus a collegial style executive. Centripetalists such as Donald Horowitz contend that "a presidential executive for divided polities, combined with an electoral system that requires or encourages candidates to reach out to (pool votes from) all salient communities" is an ideal scenario for power-sharing.[100] This is in comparison to consociationalists, who "support collegial executives that permit power-sharing among representatives of different ethnic communities".[101] Furthermore, consociationalists argue that the president in such a system is viewed as an "indivisible good", in that he or she will only represent one community or nationality for a fixed amount of time.[102] Ideally, in a parliamentary system, there is more scope for a "shareable good", that power can be equally distributed among each community, especially in situations where coalitions require bargaining and consultation to avoid inevitable collapse.[103]

[98] Graham, S., 2022. Threat of violence rises as loyalists vent frustrations with protocol. Available from: https://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/threat-of-violence-rises-as-loyalists-vent-frustrations-with-protocol-1.4840243
[99] *Ibid.*
[100] *Ibid.*
[101] *Ibid.*
[102] Stepan, A., Linz, J.J. and Yadav, Y., 2011. *Crafting state-nations: India and other multinational democracies*. JHU Press.
[103] *Ibid.*

Donald Horowitz advocates for the centripetal approach as it helps to "make moderation pay" by incentivising electoral regulations that incentivise a cross-community agenda.[104] In the case of Cyprus, Horowitz's advocacy for the presidential form of executive formation appears optimistic solely based of the demographics on the island. As commonly recommended by Horowitz, through the alternative vote electoral system, "cooperation among elected moderate politicians will produce moderate policies that can act as balm on ethnic divisions".[105] Ideally, the presidential system encourages an ethnically fluid party to compete for power by itself if it were possible.

Comparatively, McGarry argues that a presidential system is ineffective and undesirable for a number of reasons. Firstly, the demographic challenge in Cyprus makes a presidential system untenable as Turkish Cypriots would not be able to accept this approach being the considerable minority on the island. This can be evidenced by the Turkish Cypriot desire for a "formally collective, or consociational, executive" and support of the co-presidency administration proposed in the 1960 constitution and during the Annan negotiations.[106] Whilst the Turkish Cypriot population maintains a considerable minority of approximately 20%, according to the consociational argument against the presidential system, this is undesirable as they would expect to be discriminated against and not properly represented on the executive level. Compared to Northern Ireland, where the demographic balance is more equal, there is still a need for a consociational administration. The demographic imbalance in Cyprus simply incentivises the parliamentary system even more as minority concerns will always be a problem for the country to overcome.

The next obstacle concerned with the problem of adoptability is whether the proposed federation for Cyprus adopts a centripetal or consociational approach. Horowitz argues that a centripetal federation exposes the "sub-ethnic and non-ethnic complexity" of a state and that conflict will be "quarantined" to regions rather than infecting the whole state itself.[107] Furthermore, If a "group is divided across multiple self-governing regions, its regional sub-components will come to have at least some different interests (intra-ethnic divisions) and interests in common with sub-components of other ethnic groups (cross-ethnic alliances)".[108]

In comparison to this, a consociational form of federalism would look quite different. As already mentioned, segmental autonomy is a key aspect of consociationalism as McGarry mentions:

"Consociationalists do not advocate dividing communities into different regions as a way to build cross-cutting cleavages and promote an integrated identity. Rather, they seek to promote such an identity, usually seen as a long-term project in a deeply divided polity, through the accommodation of the polity's segments in consociational institutions".[109]

In the case of Cyprus, Turkish Cypriots are unlikely to support a centripetal form of federalism as there is no incentive for them to divide and sub-divide their own territorial region. As well as

[104] Horowitz, D., 1990. "Making Moderation Pay: The Comparative Politics of Ethnic Conflict Management" In Joseph Montville, ed., *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies*, pp.451-75. Lexington Books.
[105] McGarry, J. and Loizides, N., 2015. Power-sharing in a re-united Cyprus: Centripetal coalitions vs. proportional sequential coalitions. *International Journal of Constitutional Law, 13*(4), pp.847-872.
[106] McGarry, J., 2017. Centripetalism, consociationalism and Cyprus: The "adoptability" question. *Political Studies*, *65*(2), pp.512-529.
[107] *Ibid.*
[108] *Ibid.*
[109] *Ibid.*

this, McGarry mentions that Turkish Cypriots claim that they are entitled to collective self-determination which is a striking similarity to Irish nationalists in the case of Northern Ireland.[110] For Turkish Cypriots, maintaining the status quo is about the most attractive approach available and if their demands are not met, they will subsequently threaten or commit to withdrawing from negotiations. Inherent in this unwillingness to subdivide their region is of course Turkish Cypriots security concerns. Turkish Cypriots are keen to maintain their military bases and troops on the ground which is in turn unacceptable for Greek Cypriots who cite the same security concerns when approaching outcomes on an agreement. This once again highlights how the contents of the various peace negotiations in Cyprus have remained vastly consistent, whereas the real problem has existed in external contextual obstacles, influencing the extent to which each group wants to concede authority. These aspects are what constitutes an adoptable agreement, that both sides are likely to accept to first begin negotiations.

In Cyprus there are also numerous obstacles that are currently holding back its quest to achieve peace between the two ethnic groups on the island. On one hand, Greek Cypriots are in believe they have the exclusive right to explore throughout the island for hydrocarbons whilst the Turkish Cypriot side is keen to exploit the islands offshore exclusive economic zones to drill for gas.[111] Certainly, this dispute is in its early stages, and it is only one of a handful of obstacles keeping Cyprus from coming to an agreement. The clear objective for both sides is the extraction of energy sources, however the historical political enmity between the two only stokes tensions further, complicating negotiations that may occur.

Drawing from the research conducted so far, we must ask, to what extent have recent negotiations mirrored the ideal "adoptable" conditions for the island? Certainly, housing rights are of tremendous concern to both sides. It should be noted that "a fundamental difference between the two sides is that Greek Cypriots maintain 'the right of return' while Turkish Cypriots prioritise the current status quo".[112] By right of return, we refer to the Greek Cypriot argument that they have a legitimate grounds to return to their original homes as they do not officially recognise the Turkish occupation of the North of the island and that the invasion was illegal. With this in mind, particularly with the perspective of internally displaced persons within Cyprus, consulting with the people actually affected by the conflict is more important than a top down approach with less consultation as evidenced by the Annan Plan. The consociational approach that McGarry contends as the most adoptable ideally fits this mould, particularly in the collegial executive formation. By incentivising power-sharing and allowing individual groups to express themselves as they are, as well is minimising the likelihood of monopolisation from a presidential style system, the concerns of all persons involved should be heard.

Whilst the housing issue continues to be difficult to overcome, similarly the security issue is also of major concern to the Cyprus issue. As Loizides contends,

"On the issue of security, in its most recent intervention in the summer of 2017, the UN attempted to abolish Greek and Turkish unilateral guarantees for intervention. However, significant

[110] *Ibid.*

[111] Olgun, M.E., 2019. *Hydrocarbons will determine the political future of Cyprus*. Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI).

[112] Psaltis, C., Cakal, H., Loizides, N. and Kuşçu Bonnenfant, I., 2020. Internally displaced persons and the Cyprus peace process. *International Political Science Review*, *41*(1), pp.138-154.

disagreements remain, particularly on the timing and conditions for the complete withdrawal of Turkish troops".[113]

Again, this is another external contextual factor that has not been dealt with since the Annan Plan in 2004 and will continue to hold Cypriot peace talks to ransom for the foreseeable future. The withdrawal of British troops in Northern Ireland was a remarkable achievement that was facilitated by the effective cooperation of both the Northern Irish and Irish governments but also the British and American influence that helped the process. This was an example of effective consultation over a security concern in that nationalist concerns were accommodate with the removal of troops and creation of a neutral police force known as the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI). The creation of the PSNI also calmed unionist fears in that their interests and safety concerns would also be taken into account moving forward.

In the case of Cyprus, the country will have to focus on consultation with both ethnic groups on issues over property rights, security concerns and of course a power-sharing administration.[114] The issues over property rights and security concerns are just as important as we have addressed. The property rights issue will cost a considerable amount of money which of course brings in the international actors approach, most likely being facilitated by the European Union.[115] Furthermore, the issue with security concerns need not be an intractable situation. As Loizides argues, the case between Bulgaria and Turkey had many security concerns however, the Turkish minority "became more moderate, autonomous in its orientation and attached to European values following the adoption of a more conciliatory approach".[116] Loizides argues that the consociational approach and adoption of a parliamentary democracy in Bulgaria was crucial in the facilitation of positive negotiations that provided adoptable and acceptable conditions to both sides.[117] Again, this only reaffirms the benefits of a consociational approach, coupled with the consultation of primary stakeholders such as internally displaced persons, that could facilitate positive negotiations in the future for Cyprus.

G) Conclusion

Under the current circumstances, the impasse in Cyprus may well continue indefinitely, playing to the advantage of Turkish Cypriots and alienating Greek Cypriots. As mentioned, successfully identifying and dealing with external contextual factors was crucial to creating adoptable conditions in Northern Ireland and so for any possible agreement in Cyprus, negotiators must consult with Greek and Turkish Cypriots over security concerns, housing rights and the existence of troops on the island. Ideally, this paves the way for negotiations considering the application of a collegial executive in order to facilitate the bi-zonal federation that was agreed upon in 1977.

In Northern Ireland, we observed how the Good Friday Agreement's consociational content was the most adoptable arrangement for both communities in the country. Furthermore, the Good Friday Agreement has been adaptable by giving due diligence to the external contextual factors

[113] Loizides, N.G. and Kutlay, M., 2019. *The Cyprus stalemate: opportunities for peace and lessons from Turkish-Bulgarian ethnic relations*. Routledge
[114] *Ibid.*
[115] *Ibid.*
[116] *Ibid.*
[117] *Ibid.*

that could have hampered the peace process and the role of external actors in the agreement have been paramount to its success. The main problem Northern Ireland faces today concerns the role of Brexit in how it acts as a threat to the longevity of the Good Friday Agreement. Clearly, the UK leaving the EU has created a whole new range of difficulties for maintaining peace in Northern Ireland and overcoming the difficulties of the Protocol and Northern Irelands role within the UK will be crucial to this process.

If Cyprus is to be hopeful for an agreement in the future, much of this will depend on the political will of both countries being able to commit to a process that is adoptable in the immediate context, but also to a framework that is adaptable into the future, based off sound concessions and a conciliatory approach that benefits both communities. This could be achieved through effective consultation with primary stakeholders and by giving considerable attention to the pertinence of the external contextual factors that are holding such negotiations back. Addressing these factors in a measured and long-term approach may be the key to overcoming this problem. In Northern Ireland, this was instrumental in allowing the agreement to be adaptable to further obstacles and so future negotiations in Cyprus should consider this in order to come to an agreement on peace for the island.

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